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FIGURING IT OUT: APPLYING ECONOMICS TO COPYRIGHT ROYALTY
RATES FOR STREAMED MUSIC
RUTH TOWSE
Abstract. Economists are often, even regularly, used as consultants to the various parties
involved in the process of regulating copyright and as witnesses in court procedures to set royalty
rates. What insights from economic analysis do they offer? Are their contributions widely
accepted or controversial? The article offers two case studies relating to streamed music: the US
Copyright Royalty Board (CRB)’s judgement on Phonorecords III, and the discussion on ‘user-
centric’ versus ‘pro rata’ methods for distributing music streaming royalties by CMOs. Both
clearly demonstrate the conflict between efficiency and equity principles; however the main focus
of the article is the extent to which ‘platform economics’ was adopted in the discussions of music
streaming and how, if at all, that approach influenced procedures.
“Technology changes: economic laws do not ”: Shapiro and Varian Information Rules
(1999)
1. Introduction
Music streaming burst into economists’ (and others’) consciousness with the Napster
case. A few economists had written on copyright in the 1980s (see Handke and Towse,
2007) and a wider interest in the economics of digital production came from Shapiro and
Varian’s book cited above (albeit with little said on the role of copyright law). Still very
much a minority interest, economics of copyright has established itself and produced a
small literature applying it in practice to streamed music, the topic of this article.
What does economics have to say about streamed music? If one were asked to advise a
media organisation or a copyright management organisation (CMO) representing creators
of music on the economics of streaming in a court or similar enquiry, what theories would
be appropriate? Streaming represented a major and potentially destructive shift in the
technology of the reproduction of music: has economics adapted to changes wrought by
the adoption of digital technologies in the creative industries? These are the questions that
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motivated this paper and some answers are to be found in papers by economists written
in connection with two settings of streamed music royalty management: the statutory
regulation of copyright and collective management of rights. This article is not a review
or evaluation of those texts or of the decisions taken but rather a search for the type of
economic concepts used in them viewed through a methodological lens.1
The article is basically a review of two specific instances of the use of economics in de-
ciding royalty rates for the use of streamed music: first, the US Copyright Royalty Board
(CRB)’s judgement on Phonorecords III, finally published in 2019 (explained below); and
second, the ongoing discussion at the time of writing on ‘user-centric’ versus ‘pro rata’
method for distribution of streaming royalties by CMOs. Both face up to the pervasive
problem of efficiency versus equity objectives, which, though widely acknowledged in eco-
nomics, is often shuffled off, but not so here. Applying economics to these topics reveals
the difficulty of solving actual problems and I report on these topics with the questions
posed above in mind. In particular, my interest began with looking into the extent to
which ‘new’ theories embodied in what has come to be called ‘platform economics’ are
being applied in such circumstances and how theory in turn is interpreted when in applied
in practice (Towse, 2016).
Price regulation requires a view of the overall welfare implications for the consumer
and producer and for society at large (Tirole, 2016). Consultancy firms and academic
economists brought in as consultants are hired by opposing parties in a regulatory hearing
process. Research for this article consisted of reading written expert submissions (filings),
testimonies and witness statements by a number of economists before the CRB for its
process of setting the mechanical rate for interactive streamed music in its Phonorecords
III decision (and those related to earlier hearings, Web IV and SDARS III, which laid the
basis for it), as well as related literature in the economics of copyright on rate-setting.2 As
1To some extent, this follows up on my earlier work exploring economics and digitisation (Towse, 2016). I am not
a trained methodologist of economics, rather an apprentice to a master: my late husband Mark Blaug made it his
speciality (Blaug, 1980).
2Web IV (on webcasting) and SARS III (digital transmission of sound recordings and the reproduction of
ephemeral recordings by preexisting subscription services and preexisting satellite digital audio radio services). The
Phonorecords III hearing took place in 2017 and an interim decision of the rates was published in 2018; the final
official version, published in 2019 by the Library of Congress, is the one cited here — CRB (2019). The story is not
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all the relevant documents are made public, in redacted form, it is possible to gain access
to all sides of what is effectively a contest of economic ideas (see CRB, 2019).
Recent debates on the desirable method for the distribution of royalties from streamed
music to creators, however, were at the time of writing ongoing in the music business;
though they are not subject to direct regulation, the operations of CMOs around which this
debate is taking place are scrutinised by regulators. They raise the question of ‘fairness’ or
equity versus efficiency to which economists have responded. These ‘case studies’ together
formed the basis of research for this article.
2. Institutional background
There are three sets of institutional arrangements that underlie the discussion in the
paper: copyright law, regulated rate-setting by a statutory court and administrative pro-
cedures of CMOs managing musical copyrights. They are briefly outlined here.3 Copy-
right law protects the composers of music and the authors of lyrics as well as performers
through rights to control their reproduction and performance. When a song is recorded
(a reproduction), the song-writer (composer and lyricist) is due a royalty for the so-called
‘mechanical right’ (or ‘phonorecord right’ in the USA); when the song is performed in
public (in live or recorded format, for example, played on the radio), the performance
right requires compensation for both composer and performer. These rights are mostly
administered by CMOs (PROs — Performance Rights Organisations in the USA) which
specialise in one or the other type, albeit in somewhat different ways.
The royalty rate for the mechanical right (for historical reasons) is subject to compulsory
licensing in many countries: in some jurisdictions it is set by a national board, as in the
yet over for Phonorecords III, however, as there is an appeal at the time of writing by the so-called ‘services’ - Spo-
tify, Amazon, Google and Pandora. See https://completemusicupdate.com/article/spotify-et-al-file-their-appeal-
over-the-us-copyright-royalty-boards-song-rate-increase/ also https://completemusicupdate.com/article/eminem-
publisher-sues-spotify-declares-music-modernization-act-unconstitutional/.
3For details on copyright in music streaming, see Cooke (2018); also ‘Going for a Song’, a short online video available
on www.copyrightuser.org/create/creative-process/going-for-a-song/ . A definitive account of the economic issues is
to be found in Gans (2018). That article provides a useful account of the background that underlies the present paper,
which investigates the various types of economic thinking behind the recommendations and witness statements. Gans
was the expert witness on behalf of the US Music Publishers Association in the Phonograms III enquiry.
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case of the USA’s CRB.4 Song-writers and their publishers receive their royalties via an
agency or CMO that collects and distributes them, with the split depending upon the
publishing contract (Towse, 2017).5 Unpublished song-writers receive the royalties direct
from the managing agency. In the USA the royalties for non-interactive streaming and
satellite services are paid to SoundExchange which, by law, must pay 50 per cent of the
royalties to the artists (45% to the featured artists and 5% to non-featured artists -the
backing musicians and session players).
The performing right, which is not subject to regulation by a court, is administered by
the CMO (PRO in the USA) and royalties are split 50:50 between the songwriter and the
publisher of a song according to the use made of the work in a wide variety of media and
other settings, for each of which there is a different licence fee. Contracted ‘named’ per-
formers receive their royalties via the record label, as stipulated in the recording contract;
backing performers, who are paid per performance a fee, receive their royalties through a
dedicated CMO or other agency (Towse, 2014).
Established institutions were able to adapt fairly easily to digital downloading of recorded
music since supply is controlled by the record labels so that royalties for downloads could
be treated in the same way as for hard copy sales. Digitally streamed music turned out to
be very different, however, as on the one hand it could be very easily and costlessly shared
without payment, and on the other, it was offered by digital service providers (DSPs),
platforms acting as intermediaries between the consumer and the record label and the
song-writers and performers. That broke the link between the payments between the con-
sumers and the producers of music, as discussed below in relation to the pro rata versus
user-centric debate of distribution of streaming royalties, showing that the distribution
model alters signalling of price and of artistic preferences between the consumer and the
song-writer and performer. On the supply side of streamed music, however, copyright
4Canada has the Copyright Board of Canada (see Boyer, 2018/2019); in the UK the mechanical right it is regulated
by the Copyright Tribunal (the current value is 8.5% of the dealer price of a record). See also Wall (2017).
5The Harry Fox agency in the USA and the Mechanical Licensing Collection Society (MCPS) in the UK, now part
of PRS for Music) distribute mechanical royalty revenues; the mechanical right is not assigned in the UK and the
MCPS acts as an agent. A new CMO, the Mechanical Licensing Collective, has been established in the US under
the Music Modernization Act, starting from 2021: see /www.themlc.com.
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law’s provisions for payment for the use of mechanical and performing rights still apply,
though there has been some confusion over institutional arrangements for collecting and
distributing royalties.
The parties involved in music streaming are: the DSPs — Spotify, Apple Music, Amazon
et al - which distribute recorded music to customers though subscriptions or ‘for free’
financed by advertisements and the users’ data; the record labels which hold the rights to
recorded music; music publishers which hold the rights to the underlying song or musical
composition; the performers who have rights in their performances; and the song-writers,
who have authors’ rights in their work. Some of these rights are transferred ‘downstream’,
for example, the song-writer often contracts the reproduction and distribution rights to
the music publisher, who in turn contracts with the record company for the right to
record and distribute the song. The performing right remains with the song-writer and
the publisher, who, however, typically assigns it to the CMO or PRO) that administer the
royalties from live and secondary performances (which are legion). Featured performers
(who may also be the song-writers) have contracts with the record label, usually signing
their performance rights in exchange for a royalty, while backing performers are paid a
buy-out fee for their work.6 Consumers of streamed music pay a monthly subscription
(which has remained the same for the last few years, losing value to inflation, see Towse,
2020) for access to a huge catalogue of musical works to the DSP, in some cases with a
right to download and retain titles, or they put up with advertisements and the use of
their data and get the music for free. Advertisers pay the DSP for access to the service
and both sources of revenue are distributed eventually to the performers and song writers
as royalties and equitable remuneration payments.
These complex combinations of users and rights holders form the stage on which copy-
right plays its role. In this mix the question arises as to what is a fair and efficient return
to all concerned from the pot of money generated by music streaming. In addition to these
individuals and enterprises — the ‘private’ interests — there is also a social welfare (public
650 years after the record is released, sessions players can claim a share of the value of the use of the recording in
the EU.
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interest) aspect in promoting economic and cultural diversity and creativity, introducing
another dimension to the topic.
3. Economics of digital production
The economic response to the development of digital production and distribution has
shifted the focus of analysis from the static theory of the firm, with its assumption of even-
tually decreasing returns to scale and consequent increasing costs, to platform economics,
which recognises ever-increasing returns to scale and the dynamic interaction of supply
and demand with the ensuing more complex pricing issues (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2019a).
Nevertheless, the long-established theory of natural monopoly, which takes increasing re-
turns to scale into account and is used in the regulation of utilities and the CMOs, also
plays a role in regulatory proceedings as well as in the economics of digital production.
Unlike non-digital enterprises, for which there is a linear upstream downstream process,
however, platforms benefit from direct and indirect network effects which have dynamic
loopbacks. Platform economics, which has developed to analyse digital supply, offers
the appropriate analysis for music streaming by DSPs (Towse, 2020). DSPs, which may
specialise in music (Spotify) or supply music as part of a wider offer of products (Apple
Music, Amazon), are two- or multi-sided platforms. They harvest valuable data from
consumers which enables them to price discriminate in their supply and sell data on
to specialised users. These features distinguish platforms from other types of economic
enterprises and require analysis that takes them into account.
3.1. Platform economics and natural monopolies. One of the most striking eco-
nomic features of the digital economy is the switch to increasing returns to scale with
its implications for firm size (Haskel and Westlake, 2018). The basic feature of a natural
monopoly is that average costs of production fall as output increases and so marginal
cost is lower than average cost; consequently, competing (profit-maximising) producers in
the market would cause price to be higher than that set by a single supplier. Regulators
therefore assent to monopoly in such markets, subject to their controlling prices in order
to prevent exploitation of consumers: in principle, a two-part tariff is adopted with the
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price set according to the marginal cost and a ‘standing’ charge is mandated to cover fixed
costs (such as a connection charge or subscription).7 In the context of the music industry,
the CMOs are natural monopolies: as membership, non-profit cooperatives, their fixed
costs are financed by a charge to members that is deducted from gross revenue.8
Platforms share the feature of low (even zero) marginal costs: one master copy in digi-
tal form can supply an infinite number of users, the information good feature emphasised
in Boyer and Faye (2018). However, copyright law requires that usage be compensated.
DSPs deal with that by acquiring rights to distribute streamed music (as outlined above),
charging advertisers for financing free usage and charging a subscription fee to consumers
for access to the catalogue for which the DSP has obtained distribution rights from the
record labels. A brake on what could be a natural monopoly of music streaming is the
practice adopted by record labels of not giving the DSPs exclusive rights, instead offer-
ing them non-exclusive licences to their catalogue — the complementary oligopoly: the
oligopolistic major labels’ repertoire is complementary since consumers and other users,
such as broadcasters, want access to the whole musical repertoire. Moreover, as switch-
ing costs for consumers are low, they ‘multi-home’ by using several platforms, thus also
promoting competition on the demand side (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2019b).
Platform economics deals with the pricing and incentives of digital intermediaries, uti-
lizing the theory of two-and multi-sided markets, network effects, product bundling and
other such features of the information economy, inspired by the work dating from the 1980s
of Laffont and Tirole that applied principal-agent analysis to regulation of utilities (Tirole,
2016). DSPs are identified as two- or multi-sided markets charging differential prices for
the service. The theory applies to a wide range of cultural products (Bacache-Beauvallet
and Bourreau, 2020). It is clearly applicable to streamed music Towse, 2020).
7This could take the form of an upfront payment plus a rate per use in music streaming; direct agreements
include other payments, such as minimum guaranteed total payments over the course of the agreement. See
Rubinfeld (2016-19) 32 and 50 in the Web IV hearings, see www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/05/02/2016-
09707/determination-of-royalty-rates-and-terms-for-ephemeral-recording-and-webcasting-digital-performance.
However, this was not proposed by any party in the Phonorecords III hearings (and so could not be considered in
the CRB proceedings).
8Some authors argue that CMOs are themselves platforms (Page and Safir, 2018).
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4. CRB and the phonorecord rates
With the advent of streaming, royalties for the mechanical right must be paid by DSPs,
as outlined above. It is a compulsory right in the USA (as elsewhere), subject to regulation
by the CRB which sets the tariff and terms for licensing the copyrights in musical works
of songwriters and publishers ‘made and distributed as physical phonorecords, digital
downloads, and on-demand digital streams’ (CRB, 2019).
The Board is presided over by three judges, one of whom, Judge Strickler, specialises
in economics. In the recent round of rate-setting for music streaming, Strickler dissented
from the majority decision, giving rise to a detailed discussion of the appropriate eco-
nomic analysis to apply in setting the rates. Rates are set for a five year period — the
present one being for 2018—2022. The Board calls for both written and oral testimonies
on behalf of interested parties, which are published. The procedure for this round, known
as Phonorecords III, began in 2016 with hearings in 2017 and the rate was announced
in February 2019.9 The interim period was taken up with filings on behalf of interested
parties and their consideration and hearings by the judges. All documents (in redacted
form) are available online, including Strickler’s dissent document.1011
Streaming services pay royalties to three parties for the use of both mechanical and
performing rights: to record labels for the performance of their sound recordings; to the
Performing Rights Organisations (PROs or CMO representing publishers and performers
- ASCAP in the USA) for public performances of their works (live or broadcast); and to
music publishers (via the Harry Fox Agency in the USA) for the mechanical right. While
the mechanical rate has long been a feature of US copyright law, it was only with the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) that sound recording artists and record companies
acquired sound recording performance rights for interactive uses of digital works (which
9Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords
III) www.federalregister.gov/agencies/copyright-royalty-board https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/copyright-
royalty-board. A Rule by the Copyright Royalty Board on 02/05/2019.
10Several of the contributors to the CRB proceedings have published their views in the Review of Economic Research
on Copyright Issues (RERCI): see Strickler (2015), Watt (2010) and Gans (2018). RERCI also has articles on other
jurisdictions; for example, see Boyer (2004, 2018/19) and Wall (2017) on Canada.
11Several of the DSPs are set to challenge the rates set by the CRB; see https://completemusicupdate.com/
article/spotify-et-al-file-their-appeal-over-the-us-copyright-royalty-boards-song-rate-increase/.
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are not regulated by the CRB). However, as interactive streaming services pay royalties for
both, often as a single payment, discussion of the relationship between the rates for both
rights inevitably came into the assessment of the mechanical royalty rate by the CRB. The
previous settlement (Phonograms II) had been for an ‘all-in’ rate and in order to calculate
the mechanical rate, the amount paid by the DSPs to the PROs for the performance right
was subtracted from the base rate. By 2014, 52 per cent of music publisher revenues
came from performance royalties and 23 per cent came from mechanicals in the USA:
songwriters typically receive 75 per cent or more of mechanical royalty income, while
performance royalty income is split 50/50 with publishers. The statutory compulsory
licence rate set by CRB is that at which the copyright owner must offer a licence to any
use in the category covered by the terms of the decision, in this case interactive streamed
music.
The CRB hearings offer an unparalleled opportunity to see economic advice in action
at the highest level, since many of the consultants hired by the various parties are leading
academic economists. For example, ‘Written Direct Statements’ and ‘Written Rebuttal
Statements’ include testimonies from Carl Shapiro for Pandora in ‘Web IV’ and for Sirius
XM In ‘SDARS-III’), Michael Katz for the National Association of Broadcasters in ‘Web
IV’ and for Pandora Radio in Phonorecords III), Daniel McFadden (for SoundExchange
in ‘Web IV’), Robert Willig (for SoundExchange in ‘SDARS-III’), and Richard Watt for
Copyright Owners/National Music Publishers Association in ‘Phonorecords III. The chal-
lenge for the experts, however, is that a specific numerical value or set of rates has to come
out of the process. Needless to say, that is haggled over, with the CRB having the final
decision on the tariff. The Phonorecords III decision for the period 2018-2022 established
an all-in rate and rate structure for performances and mechanical reproductions, equal to
the greater of the percent of total service revenue and Total Content Cost (TCC). It was
this decision that Judge Strickler challenged in his Dissent (CRB, 2019: printed version
p.1963 et seq.).
10 RUTH TOWSE
I was interested in how platform economics would be applied by the CRB to rates for
the use of streamed music as that theory so clearly relates to the type of enterprises in-
volved. It seems, however, that the theory was not discussed in the hearings as it was not
brought to the table by the participants (and the CRB must decide according to the evi-
dence submitted). Indeed, the economists involved mostly confined themselves to familiar
microeconomic concepts - opportunity cost, equilibrium price, elasticity of demand, price
discrimination, willingness to pay, revealed preference, consumer and producer surplus,
deadweight loss, complements and substitutes, derived demand and public goods (pure
and impure) - that are routinely used in regulation of utilities (as noted by Strickler,
2013:p.4 ‘the experts often place their testimony in the context of other microeconomic
areas - such as industrial organization, law and economics and price theory’). However,
the production process in most regulated industries typically involves the use of hardware,
often with very high fixed costs, and revenue is from sales, whereas the distribution of
digital music does neither. Music streaming services are information goods with zero mar-
ginal costs, in effect public goods, for which the price is set according to willingness to pay
(Boyer, 2018/19). Moreover, those theories are largely static and are inadequate for deal-
ing with the dynamic nature of the digital platforms outlined above. On the other hand,
the dynamic aspects of complementary oligopoly features featured quite prominently in
the deliberations on price discrimination of the CRB and in Strickler’s Dissent.
That said, two less familiar concepts appeared in the hearings and in a some of the
written documentation presented as evidence. They are the ECPR (Essential Component
Pricing Rule) and the Shapley Value. The Shapley Value is concerned with the efficient
and equitable distribution of a pot of revenue to which several inputs have contributed
sequentially. The ECPR is concerned with efficient pricing of inputs in a joint output.
Both are discussed in detail below. First, though, the guidelines that ruled the scope
of the CRB’s enquiry are outlined, which, to an extent, could influence the choice of
applicable economic analysis.
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4.1. Official guidelines for CRB: the objectives for regulators. The CRB is ex-
pected to set the mechanical rate conforming to a set of well-established policy objectives
laid down in the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995:12
(1) Factor A: ‘Maximizing the Availability of Creative Works to the Public’.
(2) Factors B and C: ‘Fair Income and Returns and Consideration of the Parties’
Relative Roles.’ Factor B directs the Judges to set rates that ‘afford the copyright
owner a fair return for his or her creative work and the copyright user a fair
income under existing economic conditions.’ Factor C instructs the Judges to
weigh ‘the relative roles of the copyright owner and copyright user in the product
made available to the public, across several dimensions.’
(3) Factor D, directs the Judges ‘to minimize any disruptive impact on the structure
of the industries involved and on generally prevailing industry practices.’ (CRB,
2019: FR84 1956; printed page 1956).
Both efficiency and equity objectives are stipulated. Factors A and D are efficiency
objectives and are dealt with relatively straightforwardly in the final report; Factors B
and C attracted considerable conflict between the various parties and their expert advisers
and formed the basis of the Dissent by Judge Strickler. The efficiency discussion centred
on hypothetical deals in a market between a ‘willing buyer and seller’, which for some
also satisfied the equity objective. Indeed, many economists would argue that ‘workable
competition’ in a market solves both issues — the willing buyer and the willing seller
negotiate terms that each accepts (for example, Boyer, 2018/19; also Strickler, 2013).The
equity discussion by the CRB centred on the Shapley value. The distinction between
equity and efficiency is made here partly for presentation purposes but also because of the
‘fair income’ stipulation in B above; however, the Shapley rule relates to both aspects of
a deal.
4.2. Willing buyer-willing seller criterion. The willing buyer and seller criterion re-
quires the rate to be set ‘as if’ it were the equilibrium market rate in a market in which
12These have now been superseded by the Music Modernisation Act of 2019, reiterating the ‘willing buyer-willing-
seller’ marketplace standard: see Victor (2020).
12 RUTH TOWSE
there is effective competition, say between several oligopolists. While some strongly pro-
market economists appear to think that is feasible, others point to the distortion of the
market by the presence of the compulsory licence and the long history of its regulation,
therefore mandating a second-best solution. This represents a significant theoretical di-
vide not just of theory or methodology but also of attitude: the stance taken represents
more than just applicable economics, an issue referred to by Strickler (2015: 8) in the
context of non-complementary oligopoly structure of the sound recording industry. There
is, however, a market-based option in that freely negotiated rates between parties can be
(and often are) endorsed by the CRB. Moreover, market forces could provide an ex post
test of the regulated rate: if it be set too high — that is, exceeding ‘market rate’ - the
parties have an incentive to negotiate their own deal: if no renegotiation takes place, it
may be assumed that the regulated rate is either the ‘equilibrium’ one or is below it.
Two ways of applying the willing buyer willing seller rule and reaching a recommen-
dation were discussed in by the CRB in Phonorecords III: benchmarking and bargaining
room theory. The use of a benchmark, such as the 2012 rates in the Phonorecords II
decision, which could be adapted to new trends, might not be ‘optimal’ in the second best
sense but had the merit of reducing disruption. The bargaining room approach enables
different pairings of licensors and licensees (music publishers, record labels and interac-
tive streaming services) to negotiate agreements at varying rates below the statutory rate;
however, this would raise transaction costs if the parties were required to negotiate sep-
arately each other, the process would diminish the transaction cost savings. Transaction
cost reduction is seen as an important reason for statutory licensing (and the bargaining
room approach was rejected by Strickler in his Dissent on those grounds (but see Victor,
2020).13
4.3. Efficient component pricing rule (ECPR). As noted earlier, efficiency in the
market for streamed music requires that each streaming service is able to offer users
13The UK’s Copyright Tribunal similarly appears to adopt the benchmark approach — see CT 127/14
(order) ITV Network Ltd (ITV) v Performing Right Society (PRS) and Mechanical Copyright Protec-
tion Society Ltd (MCPS); issued on 28 July 2016 available on https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/546242/ct12714-order.pdf.
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roughly the same repertoire, therefore it requires licences from all record labels and music
publishers holding copyright works — the essential components. The literature on (and
practice of) regulation of utilities has long adopted the efficient component pricing rule
(ECPR) or parity-pricing formula and has been advocated by Baumol and many others as
the basis for setting licence fees for patents and in other regulatory settings; it applies also
to copyright works used in the production of cultural goods. As explained by Baumol: ‘The
efficiency property of the parity-pricing rule is the attribute that, when charged the parity
licence fee, a renter of the copyrighted material will be able, viably, to charge consumers a
lower price than the copyright owner’s only if the former is the more efficient of the two in
the process of transmitting the item to consumers’ (Baumol, 2020:15-17; see also Baumol,
2004). Accordingly, a royalty rate set such that there is a ‘level playing field’ between the
copyright owner and the distributor of the final product embodying the copyright work
would lead to the product being supplied at a lower price, thus improving welfare. Strickler
(2015) and Gans (2018) both advocate adopting ECPR, with Strickler also referring to
the M-ECPR (Market-determined Efficient Component Pricing Rule)14 aimed at reducing
the opportunity cost of eliminating the rents of complementary oligopolies.
4.4. The Shapley rule. The Shapley rule, developed by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, had been
long been applied in regulatory hearings, including eventually to copyright rate-setting,
and it featured in the CRB submissions of several expert witnesses and in the Judges’
final decision, both in the context of efficiency of rate-setting and of equity (‘fairness’) and
its correct interpretation was discussed at some length in the final report. Adopting the
approach of game theory, it models bargaining processes in a free market by considering
all the ways in which each party to a bargain would add value by agreeing to the bargain
and then allocates to them their average contribution to the cooperative outcome as their
share of profits. Thus the rule may be used to determine the royalty rate that would
result from negotiations between rights holders and DSPs in a hypothetical free market,
thereby offering a framework to the regulator for setting the rate. From the efficiency
14See Economides (1997, posted 2010) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1548808.
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point of view, it prevents hold-ups; as a solution to the equity objective (Factor B above),
it provides assurances that the rate set would be ‘fair’ to all parties.
In the market for streamed music, contracting proceeds sequentially so that not all the
parties involved are able to reach an agreement with each other on the distribution of the
final revenue from streaming at the time of making the initial contract. The ‘upstream’
song-writer bargains with the music publisher, who bargains further downstream with the
record label, which bargains with the DSP which then supplies the consumer. The song-
writer, publisher and labels provide an ‘essential input’ for the DSP. The Shapley value for
any one of them is the average contribution made across all of the possible permutations
of agreements between them.
In the end, the CRB set either per-play rates or percent-of-revenue rates in Phonorecords
III with different rates within each structure to promote price discrimination as a means of
matching cost to with WTP and to reflect ‘workable competition’. As a final observation
on the CRB proceedings, what we see, as for any other regulator, is that although there
were clearly established objectives for the deliberations of the Board (now changed by
the MMA as mentioned above), combined with the exposition of well-developed economic
theories, when it comes to applying them to the practical matter of what the mechanical
rate for the relatively new technology of music streaming should be, economic experts fell
back on familiar concepts in industrial economics that worked when applied to pre-digital
technology but could be stretched, at a pinch, to interactive music streaming platforms.
5. Pro rata vs user-centric rule for distribution of royalties for
streamed music
The second context for considering the practical application of economics is the rule by
which royalty revenues are distributed by CMOs. Collective management of copyright is a
long established feature of the music industry that deals with both the negotiation of rates
for the use of music and the distribution the collected royalties and other payments (such
as equitable remuneration) to copyright owners (Handke and Towse, 2007). Once the rate
is set, however, there is a further matter of efficiency and equity relating to the model
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adopted for distributing royalties to the parties involved and accordingly the distribution
rules of the CMOs are pertinent. That is the context for the pro rata versus user-centric
debate. For music streaming there are individual agreements between the record labels
and the DSPs - a willing buyer and seller situation - in which, however, the song-writers,
performers and music publishers, the ‘essential components’, are unable to take part,
though the outcome is vital to their economic wellbeing. The focus here is mostly on
the performing rights of songwriters and performers; it is worth noting in passing that in
general, royalties from performing rights by far exceed those of the mechanical right.15
This section relates to the debate over how revenues from performing rights of streamed
music should be distributed equitably to songwriters and performers.16 The pro rata
system in use by most CMOs distributes the monthly total of subscription revenues in
accordance with the number of times a title has been played, essentially the same model
as used for radio play. By contrast the user-centric model would distribute the money
directly to the artist according to the choices made by subscribers, such as what to play
and how often to play a particular title, enabling fans to directly reward their chosen
artists - in effect a direct rather than a derived demand model. As with the debates in
the CRB, both efficiency and equity issues are involved and have been confused in the
somewhat emotional debate. Two sets of contributions have helped clarify the issues:
some empirical work has been done as well as economic analysis, notably, that by Page
and Safir.
Maasø (2014) seems to have been one of the first empirical studies. Based on actual
listening patterns of all users in Norway of WiMP (a subscription music streaming service
available on various media) between August 2013 and August 2012, he found that there
was no significant difference between pro rata or user-centric payments overall but when
disaggregated, the data showed that a user-centric model would slightly reduce payment
to the artists at the end of the long tail, though it somewhat favoured Norwegian artists.
15There seems to be very little written on mechanical rate distributions by the relevant agencies. In Europe: 76%
for the performing right, 13% for mechanicals; in N. America: 86% performing and 13% mechanical (CISAC, 2019).
16For an early treatment of this topic, see Snow and Watt (2005).
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A similar analysis was done by Pederson in Denmark.17 The report by Muikku (2017)
for Digital Media Finland analysed anonymous user data provided by Spotify for their
premium subscribers based in Finland during March 2016 and March 2017. The study
analyzed over 8 million streams across 10,000 tracks and 4,493 artists (with the results
later verified by a sample five times the size). It found that with the pro rata system,
songs recorded by the top 0.4 percent of artists (in terms of overall popularity), got 9.9
percent of the money; however, when hypothetically applying the ‘user-centric’ model, the
top 0.4 percent of artists would have received just 5.6 percent of the total.
By contrast to studies based on Spotify data, Deezer (the French streaming service that
offers both subscription and ad-based services) introduced a user-centric payment system
in 2019, claiming as advantages of switching that it:
(1) Offers a fairer system for a wide range of diverse local and international artists and
genres.
(2) Corrects distortions like age or listening habits (for example, young users also tend
to skip more, resulting in further distortion).
(3) Helps tackle streaming fraud and bot activities.18
The Deezer experiment could lead to some clearer evidence of the effect of the shift. As
noted before, the equity arguments predominate over efficiency ones.
Matters are not so quite so clear-cut, however, as argued in a report by Music:)Ally
contributing to a panel discussion at ‘The Great Escape’ conference in Brighton (UK)
in 2019. It stated that Apple had modelled how changing to a user-centric system of
royalty payments would impact on artists and labels and it had found that some genres,
for instance, jazz benefited, while others did not, since ‘in fact Taylor Swift is subsidising
everybody else. An awful lot of people are playing Taylor Swift, but her music [royalties]
are shared out among everybody.’19 That is not surprising since that is indeed how the
blanket licence pro rata model deals with pay-outs by CMOs. It is a zero sum game —
17https://musically.com/2015/08/18/user-centric-streaming-payouts-artists/
18See www.deezer.com/ucps and https://support.deezer.com/hc/en-gb/articles/360002471277-User-Centric-
Payment-System-UCPS-
19Music Ally https://musically.com/2019/05/09/user-centric-streaming-payouts-apple centric.
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what some win others lose — unless (as is claimed by some) the user-centric model would
shift consumer demand towards people’s favoured artists with the knowledge that they
would earn more.
5.1. The Page/Safir studies. Two monographs by Page and Safir (2018, 2019), both
authors with a background of working for CMOs and Page having worked for Spotify as
Chief Economist, contribute to the ongoing debate on the pro-rata vs the user-centric
model, arguing that economic efficiency aspects have been ignored. As they rightly point
out: trade-offs between equity and efficiency are ‘integral to and unavoidable in the allo-
cation and distribution of licence revenue. A CMO may choose to distribute more revenue
less equitably or less revenue more equitably’ (2018: 25). More specifically, they argue
that in fact CMOs effectively operate a joint model. PRS for Music in the UK, for ex-
ample, adopts differential tariffs and distribution rules for the performing right for the
same title used in different ways, for example, for live or broadcast music, for which the
tariff strongly favours the former. These rules and choices are set within the CMO by its
members, albeit under the overall guidance of CISAC,20 and represent the CMOs’ attempt
to balance efficiency and equity issues within the collecting society. Within each ‘sector’,
however, pragmatic rules of thumb are made in the absence of any evidence of guiding
principle: Page and Safir cite as an example the division of 80 per cent to music in TV
programs and 20 per cent to music in TV commercials, part of what they call a ‘quali-
fied pro rata system’ — reminiscent of the types of decision made in the CRB decisions
mentioned above and those of other regulators.
One of the main contributions on the economics of collective rights management by
Page and Safir to this debate is to point out that transaction costs of CMOs, which
seem to have been ignored in the above-mentioned empirical studies, are greater for some
uses than in others. Indeed, the issue of administrative charges dominated debates on
the management practices of CMOs in the pre-digital era. In Towse (2013), I pointed
out CMOs would have to make enormous investments in digital data management for
transactional and individual licensing; some have combined to do so, while others in the
20The International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers, the international body of CMOs.
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EU must make deals with ones that have the facility. Even so, it is widely acknowledged
that without reliable data on recorded work titles and artists’ contribution to them along
with some sort of global repertoire database, such as that promoted by CISAC (though
it failed), digital rights data management will not work. But without that investment in
data systems individual user-centric administration would likely wipe out any benefits to
individual artists, as Page and Safir point out. In that context it is worth noting that
PRS for Music alone processed over 18.8 trillion digital music performances in 2019, up
from11.2 trillion the year before, a massive growth in data volume.21
Page and Safir contribute to the debate on pro rata versus user-centric distribution,
using the prisoners’ dilemma to illustrate the moral hazard implications: what would
result if one rights-holder or CMO were to insist on a user-centric based distribution while
others retain the pro rata model? They argue that ‘key players are forced to trade off
one party’s equity for another’s efficiency’. A further aspect to the ‘game’ is that neither
DSPs nor rights holders are likely to know how much others have been paid leading them to
conclude that ‘redistribution via user-centric is invariably hamstrung by these unavoidable
trade-offs’ (Page and Safir (2018:26), especially, I would add, when platform economics is
taken into account (Towse, 2020).
6. Conclusion
To economists setting tariffs for the use of copyright is just another type of regulation.
Economics of copyright dates back to the 1980s but it has taken a while for economists
to get involved in the practicalities of rate-setting by CMOs and by rate courts, such as
the CRB. On the other hand, it also took some time for legal practitioners to understand
the role economists can play in those processes. Copyright law is even more complex in
the digital world, especially in relation to music, and it is confusing to many participants
in the industry, especially to the artists it is supposed to benefit. Streaming has taken
hold of the music business and with it conflicts and problems over how to apply copyright
fairly and efficiently for all. Revenues from streaming in Europe now constitute just over
21www.prsformusic.com/about-us/track-record/big-numbers
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half of all music royalties collected worldwide by CMOs, compared to 25 per cent in the
USA and Canada (CISAC, 2019: 14).
Application of methodology — ‘how economists explain’ — was used to identify which
theories economists selected and the underlying criteria for adopting them when advising
industry participants on rates for the use of copyright works. Are the economic concepts
that are utilised the most appropriate and who is to say? In a court-based decision
process, such as in the USA’s CRB, it is the judges who have to decide and to set the
most appropriate rate while applying the criteria laid down by law. For the performing
right, it is the CMOs that implicitly trade-off equity and efficiency in their boardrooms;
it is an internal decision, albeit one that has to conform to the wider international system
of collective licensing.
Economists, however, judge each other’s work in the ‘court’ of academic publication,
supposedly how theoretical progress takes place. Reading the submissions of evidence
(filings and testimonies) and the CRB reports themselves shows that that very different
approaches were taken by economists to the question of the efficient and fair distribu-
tion of digital royalties. The article shows that pre-digital economics predominated in
Phonorecords III and in earlier related hearings. In a similar vein, the debate over how
royalty revenues from streamed music should be distributed by CMOs has also shown to be
amenable to older economic theories. Neoclassical and transaction cost economics sufficed
in these cases. So much for theoretical progress - here, with the innovation of platform
economics!
The article is a very preliminary stab at identifying the economic analysis used in these
regulatory settings. It shows that there is a tendency to stick to the familiar and tried-
and-tested formulas by all the parties involved and to take an incremental approach. It is
subject to several (probably many) flaws: one, for reasons of space, I do not present the
economic arguments in any detail; I often cite articles from the academic literature by the
proponents, as they are necessarily shorter and more concise than the detailed discussion
of the CRB’s hearings reported in the Federal Register. I mostly ignore discussion about
previous settlements and about the CRB’s rate-setting procedures past and present as well
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as the empirical evidence supplied by the various parties. In so doing, the article veers
away sharply from the law and economics approach as witnessed in law journals (with their
apparently unrestricted word counts): instead it may be characterised as the economics of
regulation in relation to copyright law. I hope that this paper suggests (in a preliminary
way) a new methodology for analysing the way economics is applied in practice to the
operations of a court or tribunal, bearing in mind that methodology is not just about
methods but serves a wider purpose of justifying the theory adopted.
So, were Shapiro and Varian correct that economic laws do not change? One has to say
it seems so in this context. Perhaps court settings encourage conservative choices; it is
notable that much of the literature cited is from the previous century. It could be that it
is in the nature of submissions to a court that similar (or even the same) economists are
selected by the parties to make their case; what succeeded one time may do so again and
older and more experienced protagonists are preferred. A lingering doubt persists that
neoclassical static theory of the firm with its assumption of eventual scarcity does not best
serve the digital world of plenty, even if price discriminatory rates are adopted to address
dynamic effects.
That doubt is compounded by the apparent absence of analysis of the joint output by
DSPs of commercially-saleable data along with the product (such as streamed music); one
of the main tenets of platform economics is the interaction of the different sides of the
market whether two-sided, as in the case of specialised music streaming services (Spotify),
or multi-sided platforms (such as Apple). Much of the literature on platforms originates
in Europe: is it possible that US and European economics of regulation is moving apart?
That would be interesting to methodologists as well as having implications for economics
of copyright. Future research might contrast the approaches in economic expert opinion
in regulatory settings relating to copyright in various jurisdictions.
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